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Abstract
We consider a situation where an agent’s effort is monitored by a supervisor
who cares for the agent’s well–being. This is modeled by incorporating the
agent’s utility into the utility function of the supervisor. The first–best so-
lution can be implemented even if the supervisor’s preferences are unknown.
The corresponding optimal contract is similar to what we observe in prac-
tice: The supervisor’s wage is constant and independent of his report. It
induces one type of supervisor to report the agent’s performance truthfully,
while all others report favorably independent of performance. This implies
that overstated performance (leniency bias) may be the outcome of optimal
contracts under informational asymmetries.
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1 Introduction
In many situations, employers are reluctant to tie an employee’s compen-
sation to objective (and verifiable) measures of performance because these
measures rarely reflect the employee’s true performance. Instead they may
be affected by random factors, efforts of other employees, or measure only
some of the demanded activities. An incentive contract based on such a
measure is problematic, because the employee would demand a high risk-
premium, engage in free-riding, or focus on the activities that are captured
by the performance measure.1
Subjective performance measures are often argued to be more precise and
to reflect an employee’s performance better than objective measures. A sub-
jective performance evaluation may therefore constitute a solution to the
aforementioned problems.2 However, these measures are by definition sub-
jective and, hence, non-verifiable by third parties. As a consequence, it
is often observed that supervisors distort performance ratings by not suffi-
ciently differentiating good from bad performance.3 Of particular relevance
in this respect is ”leniency bias“ which refers to a practice of systematically
overstating the employees’ performance.4
This paper analyzes a principal – supervisor – agent relationship. In order
to incorporate leniency into the model we assume the agent’s utility to enter
the supervisor’s utility function.5 This approach captures a setting where
1These problems have been analyzed in a variety of papers. See e.g. Gibbons (1998,
2005) or Prendergast (2002a) for the risk–incentives trade-off, Holmstro¨m (1982) for the
free-rider problem under limited liability and Kerr (1975), Holmstro¨m & Milgrom (1991),
Baker (1992) or Feltham & Xie (1994) for the multi-tasking problem.
2See, for instance, Baker et al. (1994).
3See e.g. the excellent survey by Prendergast (1999).
4This effect is particularly strong for poor performing employees.
5See Rotemberg & Saloner (1993), Prendergast & Topel (1996), Prendergast (2002b),
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the supervisor is lenient because of a personal relationship with the agent.
It also represents a scenario where the propensity to be lenient is a fixed
characteristic of the supervisor. The relevance of the latter has been indicated
by several field studies and psychological research.6 In the first scenario the
supervisor does not learn his preferences until after he has worked with the
agent for some time. In the second scenario he knows his preferences ex ante.
In principle, a contract can eliminate the leniency bias by punishing the su-
pervisor for good effort ratings. This, however, requires knowledge of the
supervisor’s exact preference (type). The present paper, in contrast, starts
from the assumption that the supervisor’s type is unknown. We derive opti-
mal contracts for this setting.7
Despite these informational asymmetries, the first-best solution can be im-
plemented if the agent is unlimitedly liable. The corresponding optimal con-
tract pays the supervisor a fixed wage, independent of how he evaluates the
agent. This induces a supervisor who does not care for the agent’s well-being
to always report the agent’s performance truthfully, while all other supervi-
sor types report favorably independent of performance. Thus, the principal
extracts all rents without eliminating the leniency bias, while the agent’s
incentives are reinstalled by a sufficiently high bonus payment for a good re-
port. This suggests that leniency bias may be part of an optimal contractual
arrangement under informational asymmetries.8
We also show that, under limited liability, the first-best solution is no longer
attainable. Still, a contract paying the supervisor a fixed wage and not
Rotemberg (2004, 2007) or Sliwka (2007) for similar specifications.
6See, for example, Guilford (1954) or Kane et al. (1995).
7Most of the literature on alternative preferences assumes the parties’ preferences to
be common knowledge and so does not consider the problem we address. See, however,
von Siemens (2008a, b) on the screening of inequity-averse agents.
8For different explanations see MacLeod (2003) or Grund & Przemeck (2008).
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eliminating the leniency bias may be optimal in the class of pure–strategy
direct mechanisms. A menu of contracts inducing the supervisor to report
his type truthfully and to correctly evaluate the agent is feasible but may
lead to excessive rents and may thus be suboptimal.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we relate the paper to
the literature. In Section 3, we present the model and two benchmark cases.
Section 4 solves the model when the supervisor type is unknown to principal
and agent. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
The paper is closely related to the literature on subjective performance evalu-
ation. Particularly relevant is the work on compression of ratings, e.g. Baker
et al. (1988), Murphy (1992), Harris (1994), Prendergast & Topel (1996) or
Prendergast (2002b). In contrast to the present text, none of those papers
deals with eliciting the supervisor’s preferences.
The paper is clearly related to the literature on optimal contracts in three-
tiered hierarchies consisting of a principal, a supervisor and an agent.9 There
are two crucial differences between those papers and ours. First, they typ-
ically assume hard information, i.e. a supervisor may conceal but not mis-
represent information. In our model, information is soft.10 Second, in those
models the supervisor has known standard (egoistic) preferences. Eliciting
the supervisor’s preferences is, however, a core problem of the present paper.
Finally, the paper is also related to literature combining adverse selection and
moral hazard, such as Laffont & Tirole (1986), McAfee & McMillan (1987)
or Lewis & Sappington (1997). These papers assume the player choosing
9See e.g. Tirole (1986), Laffont & Martimort (1997), Strausz (1997) or Vafai (2004).
10See Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003) for a model with soft information.
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an unobservable action also to have superior information. In contrast, our
supervisor has private information (his type) and a hidden action (to report
effort truthfully or not) while the action of the agent is hidden from the
principal but not from the supervisor.
3 The model
3.1 Description of the model and notation
Consider a stage game with a principal (P), a supervisor (S) and an agent
(A). A exerts effort e ≥ 0 at a cost c (e) in order to produce output f(e) that
accrues to P.11 The cost c (e) is twice differentiable and satisfies c (0) = 0,
c′ (0) = 0, c′ (e) > 0 for e > 0, c′ (e) =∞ for e→∞, and c′′ (e) > 0. Output
f (e) satisfies f (0) = 0, f ′ (e) > 0 and f ′′ (e) ≤ 0. Effort and output are
unobservable by P and not verifiable by third parties. Moreover, there is no
other objective measure of e. Hence, P cannot write an explicit performance
contract to motivate A. She hires S whose only task is to monitor A and to
observe and report the agent’s effort choice.
P demands a certain effort eˆ from A. As P cannot observe this effort, she asks
S for a message or report m ∈ {y, n}. By reporting m = y, the supervisor
states that A has chosen the required effort, i.e. e ≥ eˆ. Instead, m = n has
the opposite meaning e < eˆ. Although S’s observation is unobservable and
unverifiable private information, the report is verifiable by third parties. For
simplicity, S observes A’s effort perfectly at no cost.12
11Note that we sometimes write e, f or c with subscripts that, depending on the context,
either denote the supervisor’s type or an optimal effort corresponding to a certain class of
contracts.
12As an example, consider a supervisor and an agent who share an office, possibly
working on the same project. Here, S might observe A’s effort without additional effort
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All parties are risk-neutral and have zero reservation value. A central as-
sumption is that S cares for A’s well-being and thus has an incentive to
distort the effort report. We model S’s preferences as13
US = wS + λUA, (1)
where wS denotes the income of S and UA the agent’s utility. The parameter
λ ∈ [0, λ¯], λ¯ < 1, measures how strongly S cares for A’s well-being and is
therefore multiplied with A’s utility, which in turn is given by
UA = wA − c (e) , (2)
with wA as the agent’s income. Thus, the supervisor cares for A’s effort cost
and for payments the agent receives.
Except for a benchmark case in Subsection 3.3, the supervisor’s preference,
or type, is private information. In particular, the supervisor of type i (i =
1, ...,M), Si, knows the parameter λi, while for P and A the type λ is a
random variable with Pr{λ = λi} =: qi. Moreover, we assume that there are
supervisors S1 who do not care for the agent at all (i.e. λ1 = 0): q1 > 0.
14
We confine analysis to pure strategies and direct incentive–compatible con-
tracts where S reports his type truthfully and A makes the demanded effort.15
or cost. We assume effort to be perfectly observable to present our results in the most
definite way. With an imperfect effort signal, a limitedly liable agent would earn a rent
even if the signal was verifiable. This would make it harder to identify the rents induced
by the combination of hidden information, hidden action, unverifiable information and the
supervisor’s leniency.
13As mentioned before, see Rotemberg & Saloner (1993), Prendergast & Topel (1996),
Prendergast (2002b), Rotemberg (2004, 2007) or Sliwka (2007) for similar specifications.
14Note that q1 = 1 is the standard case of egoistic preferences. Thus, we consider q1 > 0
to be a reasonable assumption.
15W.l.o.g. we ignore contracts where P demands a certain effort but anticipates that A
will choose a different effort. Then, equivalently, P can as well demand the effort that A
is going to choose.
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A contract designed for supervisor type i is of the form {ai, bi, eˆi, wyi, wni}.
It specifies supervisor Si’s wages {wyi, wni} conditional on his reports m = y
resp. m = n. Moreover, the agent receives a base wage ai, and, if the super-
visor reports m = y, an additional bonus payment bi. Contracts may be the
same for different supervisor types (pooling).
The timing of the game is as follows: At stage 1, P offers a set of contracts
in the presence of both S and A. At stage 2, S and A sign this contract set
simultaneously (or the game ends). At stage 3, P may ask S to reveal his
type, either publicly or in private (if P wants to conceal the type from A).16
By announcing his type, S is understood to select one of the contracts from
the set that has been signed. We assume that the set of signed contracts as
well as the contract selected by S’s type announcement can be verified by
third parties. At stage 4, A chooses and S observes A’s effort. At stage 5,
S sends a message about the agent’s effort to P. At stage 6, payments are
made.
Finally, we are well aware that collusion is an important issue in three-tiered
hierarchies. A combined analysis of collusion and informational asymmetries,
however, is beyond the scope of the paper. We thus assume the cost of
collusion to be prohibitively high (e.g. due to legal sanctions).
3.2 The first-best solution
As a benchmark case, we derive the first-best solution assuming that effort is
contractible and no contractual frictions arise. Here, the principal does not
16Note that it does not matter whether S knows his type ex ante or learns it after
signing the contracts but before A chooses effort. This is because contracts are incentive
compatible for all types of supervisors. In this sense, it is irrelevant whether λ depends
on the particular agent or describes a fixed characteristic of S.
7
need a supervisor.17 She simply imposes the effort level that solves
max
eˆ,wA
pi = f (eˆ)− wA s.t. wA − c (eˆ) ≥ 0
Hence, the first-best effort, eFB, is given by
f ′(eFB) = c′(eFB) (3)
In the following we will repeatedly refer to the first–best problem resp. profit,
maxeˆ f(eˆ)− c(eˆ), and the corresponding first–best effort eFB for comparison.
Denote fFB := f(eFB) and cFB := c(eFB).
3.3 Complete Information
As a further benchmark, consider the case where the supervisor’s type λ is
common knowledge.18 The optimal contracts solve the following program
where the supervisor reports the agent’s effort truthfully:
max
a,b,wy ,wn,eˆ
pi = f (eˆ)− a− b− wy (4)
s.t. (ICA) a+ b− c (eˆ) ≥ a
(ICS1) wn + λ (a− c (e˜)) ≥ wy + λ (a+ b− c (e˜)) , ∀ e˜ < eˆ
(ICS2) wy + λ (a+ b− c (e¯)) ≥ wn + λ(a− c (e¯)), ∀ e¯ ≥ eˆ
(IRA) a+ b− c (eˆ) ≥ 0
(IRS) wy + λ (a+ b− c (eˆ)) ≥ 0
The incentive constraint (ICA) ensures that A chooses the requested effort
and does not deviate to e = 0. (ICS1) and (ICS2) make the supervisor report
A’s effort honestly. Finally, (IRA) and (IRS) ensure participation.
17Note that P cannot do better by leaving a rent R to A and hiring a supervisor at a
negative wage wS = −λR. This is due to λ < 1.
18Because preferences are known we drop the subscript i here.
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Proposition 1 The optimal contract under complete information is a∗ = 0,
b∗ = cFB, eˆ∗ = eFB, w∗y = 0, w
∗
n = λcFB. It implements the first-best effort
and profit.
The supervisor’s wages make him indifferent between reports m ∈ {y, n},
he earns a higher wage for reporting poor performance of the agent. This
induces truthful reporting and the agent’s effort becomes basically verifiable.
Thus, the first–best solution is implemented. The proposed wages are non-
negative which means that the contract is feasible even if we impose wealth
constraints on S and A.
Interestingly, the first-best solution can also be implemented if the supervi-
sor’s type is unknown, as the following section shows.
4 Incomplete Information
Suppose the distribution of supervisor types is common knowledge while the
realization λi is Si’s private information. The optimal contracts depend on
whether the players are wealth–constrained. We analyze unlimited liability
in subsection 4.1, while subsection 4.2 deals with the limited liability case.
4.1 Unlimited liability
Proposition 2 If the players are unlimitedly liable, the optimal contract is
unique and satisfies a∗ = q1−1
q1
cFB, b
∗ = cFB
q1
, eˆ∗ = eFB, w∗y = w
∗
n = 0. It
implements the first-best effort and profit.19
19When talking about uniqueness, we only consider sets of contracts where each con-
stituent contract has positive acceptance probability. Given an optimal set of contracts,
it is irrelevant if one adds contracts that are never accepted in equilibrium.
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The supervisor’s wage, w∗y = w
∗
n, is independent of his report. This induces
a supervisor that does not care for A’s well-being to report truthfully20,
while all other types report m = y independent of A’s effort choice. As a
consequence, the leniency bias is not eliminated. This, however, does not
cause any problems, since the bonus of the agent is adjusted in order to
provide appropriate effort incentives, while the base wage is negative in order
to avoid any rents for A.
The contract is unique, since all other types of contracts either leave a rent
to certain types of supervisors or induce S not to accept the contract. The
only contract that is accepted while not leaving a rent for S has a fixed wage
equal to S’s reservation utility. This contract does not work under limited
liability since A’s base wage is negative.
4.2 Limited liability
If wages must be non-negative, the contract of Proposition 2 is no longer
feasible. We analyze the optimal contracts under wealth constraints. The
problem, however, becomes far more complicated. To simplify the exposition
but still highlight the effects at work we analyze the case of two supervisor
types, 1 and 2, with 0 = λ1 < λ2 < 1 that each occur with positive probability
and q1 = 1− q2. This is common knowledge.
With any contract, Si is either indifferent between reports m ∈ {y, n} (in
20One may criticize that, due to the indifference of S, he may as well misrepresent
his information. If, however, we assume the supervisor to dislike lying only a little bit,
the indifference is broken. Recent experimental evidence suggests that this is indeed a
reasonable assumption (see e.g. Gneezy 2005). Note that this would also imply that one
contract could induce several types of supervisors to report the agent’s effort truthfully.
Under a contract satisfying wn = wy + λˆb supervisor types in an interval around λˆ would
report truthfully.
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which case truthful reporting is optimal for Si), or he strictly prefers one of
the reports in which case he reports independent of A’s effort. Thus, with
any optimal set of contracts where A exerts positive effort, at least one of
the supervisor types must be induced to report effort truthfully. Therefore,
any equilibrium contract must satisfy wy + λib = wn for at least one type of
supervisor i ∈ {1, 2}. A contract where only one type, i, reports truthfully, is
denoted by ”S-pool-i“. Contracts that induce both types to report truthfully
are denoted by ”S-sep“.
The agent may get a contract that depends on the supervisor’s type (”A-
sep“) or a contract that is independent of the supervisor’s type (”A-pool“).
In the latter case, P may reveal (”rev“) or not reveal (”norev“) the type to
A.21 Thus we have nine potential cases:
A-rev-sep A-rev-pool A-norev-pool
S-pool-1 (A) (B) (C)
S-pool-2 (D) (E) (F)
S-sep (G) (H) (I)
However, we can restrict attention to three of these cases.
Lemma 1 Under limited liability the search for the optimal contract can be
restricted to cases (C), (F), (G). The remaining cases are profit–dominated.
Under contract set (C) both supervisor types get the same contract, S1 re-
ports truthfully, while S2 always reports m = y and the type is not revealed
to A. Contract set (F) differs only in the fact that here S2 tells the truth
while S1 reports m = n. Note that under both contracts, the type report of
the supervisor is not used and thus not needed.
21A’s contract cannot be type–dependent if the type is to be concealed from him. And,
obviously, it does not make sense to reveal only one of the types.
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In contrast, under contract set (G), all wages and A’s requested effort are
type–dependent and the type is revealed to the agent.
Which of these contract sets is optimal depends on the distribution of types
(q1), the parameter λ2 and the output and cost function (f and c). Recall
P’s profits (see the proof of Lemma 1, subscripts C, F , G denote the cases):
(C) piC = fC − cC
q1
(5)
(F ) piF = fF − cF
(
1 +
q1λ2
1− q1
)
(6)
(G) piG = q1 (fFB − cFB) + (1− q1)fG − cG (2− q1(2− λ2)) (7)
It is easy to see that for q1 → 0, piF → piFB, while for q1 → 1, piG → piFB
(with eG = 0 and hence fG = cG = 0) and piC → piFB.
Proposition 3 Let the players be limitedly liable. Depending on the param-
eters of the model, any one of the contract sets (C), (F), (G) can be optimal.
In the following we discuss why we cannot further reduce the set of possibly
optimal contracts.
A contract of form (C) leaves an income rent to the agent, since S2 reports
m = y, i.e he does not ”punish“ underprovision of effort. This problem is
especially severe if S2 is very likely to occur. Accordingly, piC is increasing
in q1.
Under a contract of form (F), S1 receives an income rent (wn) from lying and
reporting m = n. This is of particular relevance if q1 is high. Obviously, piF
is decreasing in q1.
Finally, under contract set (G) S is presented with two contracts from which
he chooses one. Recall that the two supervisor types are equal except for their
care for A’s well-being. In particular, their utility from a wage payment is
the same. This implies that the only way to induce self-selection is to treat
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A differently depending on whether the supervisor claims to be of type 1 or
2. In fact, the principal has to give A a rent, if the supervisor chooses the
contract designed for type 2. By limited liability, S2 then has positive utility.
This, in turn, requires wn2 > 0 in order to induce him to report truthfully. As
the other supervisor does not care for the agent’s well-being, such a contract
is less desirable for him. Still, he has an incentive to claim to be of type 2,
to report m = n, and get wage wn2 > 0. In order to destroy this incentive,
type 1 receives an informational rent. Hence, there are two types of rent. If
these rents become too high, a contract of form (G) is suboptimal.22
We have shown that under wealth constraints and informational asymmetries
it can be optimal to have the simple contract (C) that pays S a fixed wage
and does not eliminate the leniency bias. There, only the supervisor of type 1
tells the truth while all others report favorably independent of performance.
Again, this simple contract combined with leniency bias can be observed in
practice.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the problem of designing optimal contracts
in a principal-supervisor-agent relationship where the supervisor cares for
the agent’s well–being. We have shown that a simple contract paying the
supervisor a fixed wage equal to his reservation value may be optimal and may
22If there are more than two types of supervisors (M > 2), the optimal separating
contracts, (G), have similar characteristics. There, each type has a binding incentive to
imitate higher types and report m = n and at the same time the binding incentive to
imitate lower types and report m = y. Nevertheless, full separation (self–selection) of
types is feasible but very costly, which makes low or zero efforts for most types optimal.
A corresponding proof can be downloaded from the authors’ websites.
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even implement the first-best solution. Thus, not eliminating a leniency bias
may be an optimal contractual arrangement under informational asymmetry.
We discussed private information and limited liability for the case of two
supervisor types. This restriction is due to the fact that the number of
possible contracts grows exponentially in the number of types. Some types
of contracts can be straightforwardly solved for arbitrary numbers of types or
continuous type space. Contract type (F) generalizes to contracts in which
some or all supervisor types are pooled at some higher type, i.e. this type
reports truthfully. Optimality of these contracts unrealistically requires that
this type has more probability mass than others, including, in particular, the
type that does not care for the agent’s well-being.23
Contract type (G) is always feasible, but with many types of supervisors it
becomes prohibitively expensive to satisfy the many incentive constraints.
Then very low or zero efforts are optimal for most types. Contract type
(C), on the other hand, is always feasible and becomes better with higher
probability of the supervisor type that does not care for the agent. Thus we
consider contract (C) to be an important candidate for the optimal contract.
It also coincides with contracts observed in practice.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. It is easily verified that the proposed contract
satisfies (4). The principal’s profit simplifies to the first–best profit, pi =
23It seems intuitive to assume that the latter type is the most probable type to occur.
One could use a utility function similar to (1) to explain findings in experiments on dictator
games. In these experiments, the mode is typically at zero. This means that the amount
of money most often donated is zero. See e.g. Figure 4 in Bolton et al. (1998).
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fFB − cFB.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is done in two steps. First, we show that
the proposed contract yields the first-best solution and is therefore optimal.
Second, we show that it is the only contract with this property.
1. If w∗y = w
∗
n = 0, a supervisor of type λ1 = 0 reports the agent’s effort
truthfully, while all other types report m = y. Thus, A chooses effort
eˆ, if
a+ b− c(eˆ) ≥ a+ (1− q1) b ⇔ b ≥ c(eˆ)
q1
Thus, under the proposed contract, A exerts the first–best effort eˆ =
eFB. Moreover, S and A accept the contract since their payoffs are
UA = a
∗ + b∗ − cFB = 0 and US = λUA = 0. Finally, P receives the
first–best profit: pi = fFB − b∗ − a∗ = fFB − cFB.
2. The principal’s expected profit can be written as
pi = f (e)− E [wS]− E [wA]
where E [wS] and E [wA] are the expected wage payments to S and
A. From S’s participation constraints it follows that E [wS] ≥ −λ¯UA.
Hence, the principal’s profit is not higher than f (e) + λ¯UA−E [wA] or
f (e) + λ¯UA − (UA + c (e)). As λ¯ < 1, the first-best profit can only be
achieved if UA = 0, i.e. A must not receive a rent.
Assume now that the contract is such that no supervisor type reports
the agent’s output truthfully. Then the agent chooses e = 0, which is
clearly suboptimal.
Moreover, a contract can only be optimal if S accepts it and no type
of supervisor receives a positive rent. The latter requirement im-
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plies max {wy, wn} ≤ 0. Otherwise, a supervisor of type λ1 = 0 re-
ceives a strictly positive rent. As UA = 0, the only contract satisfying
max {wy, wn} ≤ 0, inducing at least one type of S to report y truthfully
and ensuring participation of S has wy = wn = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. We analyze the cases separately and then show that
only the cases (C), (F), (G) remain. Denote fi := f(ei) and ci := c(ei) for
any subscript i.
(A) Here, both types of supervisor get the same wages with wy = wn while A
gets a type-dependent contract (a1, b1, eˆ1) and (a2, b2, eˆ2). The following
result also holds for M > 2 types and also for continuous type space.
By wy = wn, supervisor 2 (or higher) prefers report m = y whenever A
has positive utility. Since A learns the type, he will never exert positive
effort if type 2 (or higher) occurs. Thus, e2 = 0 and a2 = b2 = 0.
Type 1 only cares about wages, thus there is no incentive to imitate
type 2. Type 2, however, would like to imitate type 1 if A’s utility
from contract 1 is above that from contract 2. Given the above derived
contract 2, we need a1 + b1 − c1 = 0 to make supervisor 2 indifferent.
The cost–minimizing way to achieve this with positive effort is a1 = 0,
b1 = c1. The cost–minimizing wages are wy = wn = 0. With these
contracts, P attains zero profit if type 2 occurs and the first–best profit
if type 1 occurs. The optimal contracts and the corresponding profit
16
are:
wyi = wni = ai = 0, i = 1, . . . ,M (8)
bi =
cFB i = 10 i = 2, . . . ,M , ei =
eFB i = 10 i = 2, . . . ,M (9)
piA = q1 (fFB − cFB) (10)
(The same result applies for continuous type space as long as type 1
has positive probability mass).
(B) Here, wy = wn and the agent is informed about the type but gets a
type–independent contract, i.e. P demands the same effort no matter
which type is announced.
First, type 2 prefers m = y and will lie about effort unless the requested
effort is zero. Second, the agent knows the type and will exert zero effort
if type 2 occurs. Thus, there is no uniform positive effort that the agent
would exert in presence of both types. This means that in case (B) the
only implementable effort is zero.24
(C) Here, wy = wn, the type is not revealed and A gets a type–independent
contract (a, b, eˆC). S2 prefers report m = y.
The agent knows that type 1 reports truthfully while type 2 always
reports m = y. Thus, the agent will exert effort if
a+ b− cC ≥ a+ q2b ⇒ b ≥ cC
1− q2
24One may argue that P could offer a pooling contract with a strictly positive requested
effort, but accept that the agent deviates if the supervisor is of type 2. But then P can
as well demand different type–dependent efforts and obtain the same outcome (see (A)).
As mentioned before, w.l.o.g. we restrict attention to contracts where A does not have an
incentive to deviate from the requested effort.
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There is no imitation issue here because the type information is not
used, so P would not have to ask for S’s type at all. The optimal
contract and P’s profit are
a = 0, b =
cC
1− q2 , eˆC > 0, wy = wn = 0 (11)
piC = fC − cC
1− q2 = fC −
cC
q1
(12)
(D) Here, both types of supervisor get the same wages with wy +λ2b2 = wn
while A gets a type-dependent contract (a1, b1, eˆ1) and (a2, b2, eˆ2).
Since λ1 = 0, supervisor 1 prefers wn and thus A will not exert positive
effort if type 1 is announced. Thus, cost minimization implies a1 =
b1 = eˆ1 = 0. Supervisor 2 must be prevented from imitating type 1
with report m = n. This would give him a utility of wn since A’s
utility is zero. Thus contract 2 must give him at least the same utility.
However, the only way to achieve this is to increase a2. Note that
changing wy or b2 only increases wn and therefore does not solve the
problem. Moreover, supervisor 1 is indifferent towards changes in A’s
wage. The optimal contracts for case (D) are:
a1 = b1 = eˆ1 = 0, a2 = b2 = c2, eˆ2 > 0, wy = 0, wn = λ2c2
where c2 is the cost associated with the profit–maximizing effort. De-
noting cD := c2 and fD := f2 we get
piD = −q1λ2c2 + q2 (f2 − 2c2) (13)
= (1− q1) (fD − cD)− cD (1− q1(1− λ2)) (14)
(E) Here, wy + λ2b = wn, and the agent is informed about the type and
gets a type-independent contract. An argument similar to the one in
(B) applies and the only implementable effort is again zero.
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(F) Here, the supervisors get the type–independent contract wy+λ2b = wn,
and the type is not revealed to A. Thus, P doesn’t need to ask the
supervisor for his type and there is no imitation issue. Type 1 always
reports m = n while type 2 tells the truth. A gets a type–independent
contract (a, b, eˆF ) and exerts positive effort if his bonus satisfies
a+ q2b− cF ≥ a ⇒ b ≥ cF
1− q1
We get the optimal contract by setting the cost–minimizing wages:
a = 0, b =
cF
1− q1 , eˆF > 0, wy = 0, wn = λ2
cF
1− q1
The principal’s profit is
piF = fF − q1λ2 cF
1− q1 − q2
cF
1− q1 = fF − cF
(
1 +
q1λ2
1− q1
)
(G) Here, the supervisors get contracts with wy1 = wn1 and wy2 + λ2b2 =
wn2, the agent knows the type and gets type-dependent contracts (a1, b1, eˆ1)
and (a2, b2, eˆ2).
Supervisor Si prefers selecting the right contract if
S2 : wy2+λ2(a2 + b2 − c2) ≥
max {wy1 + λ2(a1 + b1 − c1), wn1 + λ2(a1 − c1)} , (15)
S1 : wy1+λ1(a1 + b1 − c1) ≥
max {wy2 + λ1(a2 + b2 − c2), wn2 + λ1(a2 − c2)} . (16)
Applying the wages from above, these conditions simplify to
wy2 + λ2(a2 + b2 − c2) ≥ wy1 + λ2(a1 + b1 − c1), (17)
wy1 ≥ wy2 + λ2b2 (18)
which implies
a1 + b1 − c1 ≤ a2 − c2
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As the left-hand-side of the inequality is non-negative, (IRA), we obtain
a2 ≥ c2. By cost minimization, a2 = c2 and a1 = 0 (limited liability).
Moreover, from A’s incentive compatibility constraints, we get b1 = c1
and b2 = c2. Finally, wy2 = 0, wn2 = λ2c2, and using (18), wy1 = λ2c2
and wn1 = λ1c1 + λ2c2. The principal’s profit is:
piG = q1 (f1 − c1 − λ2c2) + q2 (f2 − 2c2) (19)
= q1 (f1 − c1) + (1− q1) (f2 − c2)− c2 (1− q1(1− λ2)) (20)
Obviously, eˆ1 = eFB and eˆ2 < eFB. The profit is below the first–best
profit since S1 gets a rent and A gets a rent if S2 occurs. Denote
cG := c2 and fG := f2. Thus,
piG = q1 (fFB − cFB) + (1− q1) (fG − cG)− cG (1− q1(1− λ2)) (21)
= q1 (fFB − cFB) + (1− q1)fG − cG (2− q1(2− λ2)) (22)
(H),(I) Here, the type–dependent contracts for S must satisfy wy1 = wn1 and
wy2 + λ2b = wn2 while the agent gets a type–independent contract
(a, b, eˆ). In order for supervisors to reveal their type truthfully, it is
necessary that
wy1 ≥ wn2, (23)
wy2 + λ2(a+ b− c(e)) ≥ wy1 + λ2(a+ b− c(e)) ⇒ wy2 ≥ wy1 (24)
However, from these we get wy2 ≥ wn2, which contradicts wy2 + λ2b =
wn2, since positive effort requires b ≥ c(eˆ) > 0. Accordingly, the only
implementable effort is zero.
The contract types (B), (E), (H), and (I) are not optimal since they cannot
induce the agent to choose positive effort. Moreover, piG ≥ piA, since by
20
setting eˆG = 0 we get piG = piA. Thus, (A) is dominated. In addition, (D) is
dominated since piG ≥ piD if the same effort is chosen in both cases, eˆG = eˆD.
Thus, only (C), (F), (G) remain.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the following example. Output and
cost are f(e) = e, c(e) = e
3
3
and q1 =
3
4
. We get eFB = 1, piC = eˆC − 4eˆ
3
C
9
,
piF = eˆF− 13 eˆ3F (1+3λ2) and piG = 112 (6 + 3eˆG − eˆ3G(2 + 3λ2)). The principal’s
maximum profits are
piC =
1√
3
, piF =
2
3
√
1 + 3λ2
, piG =
1
6
(
3 +
1√
2 + 3λ2
)
(25)
It can be verified that (F) is optimal for 0 < λ2 ≤ 0.061, (G) is optimal for
0.061 < λ2 < 0.881 and (C) is optimal for λ2 > 0.881.
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